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Abstract
How does power work in practice? Much of the ‘stuff’ that state agents and other 
international actors do, on an everyday basis, remains impenetrable to existing 
International Relations theory. This is unfortunate, as the everyday performance of 
international practices actually helps shape world policy outcomes. In this article, we 
develop a framework to grasp the concrete workings of power in international politics. 
The notion of ‘emergent power’ bridges two different understandings of power: as 
capability or relation. Emergent power refers to the generation and deployment of 
endogenous resources — social skills and competences — generated in particular 
practices. The framework is illustrated with an in-depth analysis of the multilateral 
diplomatic process that led to the 2011 international intervention in Libya. Through 
a detailed account of the negotiations at the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and the European Union, the article demonstrates how, in practice, 
state representatives translate their skills into actual influence and generate a power 
politics that eschews structural analysis. We argue that seemingly trivial struggles over 
diplomatic competence within these three multilateral organizations played a crucial 
role in the intervention in Libya. A focus on practice resituates existing approaches to 
power and influence in International Relations, demonstrating that, in practice, power 
also emerges locally from social contexts.
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Introduction
In 2011, an international military operation helped remove the Gaddafi regime in Libya. 
To some, in particular liberal internationalists, the intervention reflected the power of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine since the end of the Cold War (Bellamy and 
Williams, 2011). Critical theorists (Bush et al., 2011) dismissed the operation as a badly 
construed cover for Western interests in the region, while realists concluded that a ‘neat 
realist narrative,’ with its focus on military capabilities and balance of power, could not 
account for the Libya intervention (Krasner, 2013: 339). Regardless of how we approach 
the intervention, there remain many unanswered questions when it comes to the multilat-
eral diplomatic process behind it. For instance, how did France and the United Kingdom 
(UK) manage to overcome American reluctance to intervene? Why did deeply skeptical 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, including Germany and Turkey, 
eventually support the military operation? How were BRICS1 countries, despite two 
potential vetoes and a relatively strong coincidence of interest at the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), ultimately kept at bay? Finally, what pushed European Union 
(EU) member states to prepare a humanitarian mission that everybody knew would never 
be carried out?
At the theoretical level, these questions raise a larger issue in the study of world 
politics: how does power work in practice? More specifically, what makes one country 
more influential than another in multilateral negotiations? Why do certain states appear 
surprisingly powerless on the world stage, while others punch above their weight? 
Existing International Relations (IR) theories provide structural answers to these ques-
tions, but we still lack a clear understanding of the concrete workings of power in 
international politics. Take a classic example, neorealism: as effective as the distribu-
tion of material capabilities may be in shaping outcomes, the theory remains indeter-
minate unless we can explain how positional forces actually translate into power 
dynamics around the multilateral negotiating table. While IR theories may help iden-
tify who pulls the strings of multilateral diplomacy, they are less useful to understand 
how strings actually get pulled.
This article fills a gap in IR studies by theorizing power in practice. The practice per-
spective explores world politics, including organizations, communities, professions, 
policy making, and state interaction, from the perspective of everyday performances that 
embody shared knowledge (Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Neumann, 2002). One of the most 
common criticisms of IR’s recent turn to practice is that it tends to overlook power. 
Specifically, some find the approach too agency-oriented (Hopf, 2010: 345). We agree 
that a practice approach should not ‘obscur[e] the broader context in which practices 
occur’ (Duvall and Chowdhury, 2011: 348). Yet we also observe that structural perspec-
tives in IR problematically fail to explain three relevant facets of power dynamics:
(1) how structural resources translate into actual influence;
(2) how endogenous resources may also be locally generated (or undermined) within 
the social process itself; and
(3) why many political outcomes significantly differ from strictly distributional 
determinations.
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Taking international practices seriously, we argue, helps address these shortcomings. 
The everyday performance of international politics is not a mere epiphenomenon of 
deeper structural forces; it is also a generative force in and of itself. Central to our frame-
work is the notion of ‘emergent power,’ which refers to the endogenous resources — 
social skills or competences — generated within practices. Through a detailed account of 
the multilateral negotiations on Libya at the UNSC, NATO, and EU, we demonstrate 
how state representatives use various tactics to wield influence by establishing them-
selves as skillful diplomats, while undermining similar claims by their opponents.
Importantly, we do not claim to account for the Libyan war, in the sense of identifying 
all its multifaceted causes. Instead, our more limited purpose is to provide an account of 
the intervention, centered on multilateral diplomacy. In IR, most theories tend to explain 
military interventions by inferring the belligerents’ interests, derived from the interna-
tional structure (e.g. balancing), domestic politics (e.g. diversion), or norms (e.g. human-
itarianism). There is no doubt that interests, norms, and structural forces played a role in 
the Libya case, but our argument operates on a different analytical plane. In tune with 
practice theory, we refrain from using motives, which are often empirically intractable, 
as explanatory variables. Instead, we zoom in on the actual moves performed by national 
diplomats at the UNSC, NATO, and EU in order to reconstruct the dynamics of influence 
that gave the intervention its peculiar shape and pace. In so doing, we shed light on 
power in practice — a critical dimension of world politics that both interest- and norm-
based accounts tend to overlook.
Power in IR theory and in practice
As useful as existing IR theories may be to illuminate structural facets of power, practice 
theory is unique in capturing the emergent quality of power dynamics in international 
politics. This section begins by distinguishing between two broad ontologies of power in 
IR theory: capabilities and relations. It then shows how a practice approach effectively 
spans the two notions: power in practice emerges out of micro-struggles over specific 
resources that are in part endogenous. These resources take the form of socially recog-
nized competence, which is locally generated, contested, and played out, to eventually 
affect world policy.
Capabilities versus relations
The most basic distinction in existing conceptions of power concerns whether power is a 
capability — something that one owns — or a relation — a social dynamic (Baldwin, 
2013). The best-known proponents of the former approach are realists, who argue that 
the international power structure essentially amounts to the distribution of material capa-
bilities, that is, the balance of power argument (Waltz, 1979). Thus, the power of a state 
can be measured in terms of its military hardware and other material resources. The prob-
ability of conflict and cooperation depends on the distribution of these capabilities. The 
capability approach to power does have a relational element in that it focuses on the rela-
tive distribution of resources. However, realists assume that the relation between two 
parties is determined by capabilities, that is, capabilities become a proxy for power. 
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Many liberal institutionalists also think of power in terms of capabilities, stressing the 
importance of asymmetrical economic relations to benefit from interdependencies 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977). In addition to economic resources, liberals such as Nye 
include non-material capabilities, such as culture and ideology (Nye, 1990). Although he 
later revisited his position, defending a more relational view, Nye originally defined soft 
power in terms of objective resources, based on the relative number of US movies, pat-
ents, high-level universities, and so on (Nye, 1990: 26; see also Nye, 2004).
In contrast, the relational perspective approaches power as vested not in capabilities, 
but in social relations. Criticizing capability-based approaches to power, Baldwin (1989: 
27) famously claimed that ‘the difficulty of measuring political power is due to the 
absence of something that fulfills the measure-of-value function of money.’ In econom-
ics, money is the fundamental resource because it serves as a generalized medium of 
exchange. However, no such thing exists in politics, argues Baldwin, where the value of 
specific resources is bounded by particular contexts. For us, the key issue is not so much 
the ‘fungibility’ of resources (Keohane and Nye, 1977), but rather their indeterminacy or 
contingency. It is only in a particular social context that resources truly become a means 
to an end and may deliver effects. Baldwin (1989: 138) argues that any capability can be 
a source of power granted the proper conditions: resources are ‘situationally specific’ 
(see also Guzzini, 1993). Consequently, the ‘only way to determine whether something 
is a power resource or not is to place it in the context of a real or hypothetical policy-
contingency framework’ (Baldwin, 1989: 134). Power dynamics are contingent on the 
specific relationships in which they are taking place.
In its rationalist version, the relational perspective on power often takes the form of 
bargaining or game-theoretical approaches. Schelling (1980 [1960]), perhaps most 
famously, sought to identify the logic of tactics of influence — unilateral promises, 
reciprocal promises, threats, commitments, the elimination of options, hostages, con-
tracts, appeals to higher authority. Others have refined this framework over recent dec-
ades, with reference to audience costs, preferences, incomplete information, and so on, 
to demonstrate that even materially weaker players may come out as the winner due to 
the bargaining process and communication between parties (Fearon, 1998). In the case 
of international interventions, these scholars explain preferences for Security Council 
authorization of intervention as a search for ‘burden sharing’ and ‘legitimacy for domes-
tic and international purposes’ (Voeten, 2001: 856). Yet, if what is exchanged in a bar-
gaining situation is communication, then we need to take human interaction as a 
symbol-exchanging process seriously. This has been particularly important for construc-
tivists, who have focused on meaning as crucial for power outcomes. Reus-Smit (2004) 
argues that to understand power correctly, it needs to be conceived as: relational, not 
possessive; primarily ideational, not material; and intersubjective and social, not subjec-
tive and non-social.
Building on these insights, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 42) propose a broader con-
ceptualization: ‘power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that 
shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate.’ The authors 
typologize four forms of power (compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive) 
depending on ‘the kinds of social relations through which power works’ and ‘the speci-
ficity of social relations through which effects on actors’ capacities are produced’ 
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(Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 42). This typology subsumes Dahl’s original conceptualiza-
tion (‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would 
not otherwise do’) as well as key amendments about agenda-setting and ideology and 
discourse. From a structural or productive perspective, international interventions can 
be seen as the result of ideological dominance or the discursive negotiation of different 
understandings of sovereignty.
Although the different relational approaches do much to problematize the dominant 
ontology of power-as-capabilities, they risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater by 
not paying sufficient attention to resources. Baldwin, for instance, never spells out where 
‘situationally specific’ resources come from. For their part, Barnett and Duvall have little 
empirical guidance to offer on the nature and expression of power resources. In fact, for 
relational scholars, it would seem that capabilities pre-exist power relations as exogenous, 
latent resources: they are already there, so to speak, waiting to be activated in a particular 
context. This is obviously the case in many circumstances: a trade diplomat enters an 
international negotiation armed with his or her country’s economic assets. Moreover, 
institutional rules — for instance, the veto at the Security Council — contribute to biasing 
the landscape prior to our observation of power in practice.
However, in this article, we argue that this power baseline of pre-existing assets does 
not exhaust the variety of resources that structure power relations. In many cases, includ-
ing the multilateral negotiations on Libya, power also emerges from the interaction per 
se. In other words, some power resources are produced locally, in and through a particu-
lar practice. This omission is a common flaw of both power-as-relationships and power-
as-capabilities approaches, which we hope to redress. How are power resources generated 
and played out in social relations?
Emergent power: The struggle for competence
The notion of emergence originates in physics and philosophy but is now also a key 
concept in social theory (Archer, 1995; for an overview, see Sawyer, 2001). Today, it 
refers to the complex patterns evolving from multiple interactions among units, render-
ing the system more than the sum of its parts. Canonical examples of emergence include 
traffic jams, ant colonies, and bird flocks. However, the types of emergence that are 
observed in human social interaction result from the unique fact that the participating 
entities are symbol-generating and interpreting agents (Sawyer, 2001: 561). Crucially, 
emergent properties are not individual attributes. As Lewis (2010: 210) writes: ‘Emergent 
properties are structural or relational in the sense that their existence depends [on] parts 
being organized or arranged into a particular structure that involves them standing in 
specific relations to one another.’ Emergent power resources, then, originate from, and 
belong to, specific interaction settings. Consequently, an emergent effect is not additive 
or predictable from our knowledge of its components.
In tune with recent advances in IR practice theory, we emphasize the negotiation of 
competence as the fundamental social process of power emergence (Adler and Pouliot, 
2011: 6–7; Adler-Nissen 2013; see also Eagleton-Pierce, 2013). Most performances of a 
practice contain an implicit claim of authority — that ‘this is how things are done.’ 
Power plays out in the clash of practices and their authority claims. Put differently, at the 
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level of practice, power involves a socially recognized competence or mastery in practic-
ing X. Any social context produces a notion of what it means to be an able player at the 
game. Being so recognized typically allows one to wield a form of endogenously gener-
ated power often called influence, that is, power without apparent coercion. The exer-
cise of power in practice, thus, rests on a never-ending struggle for recognition as 
competent in a given practice. Once practices are recognized as competent, they 
‘produc[e], in and through social relations, effects that shape the capacities of other play-
ers in the game to determine their circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 
42). A spontaneous order emerges. Competence may then be accumulated in the form of 
reputation or organizational bias, for instance.
As we have already noted, emergent power always works in tandem with exogenous 
assets, that is, with resources that originate from outside the specific practices under 
study (the market size of a World Trade Organization member, for instance). The two 
forms of resources — endogenous (i.e. locally produced) and exogenous (originating 
from outside the specific social site) — complement each other in explaining world poli-
tics. For instance, a country equipped with such exogenous resources as large public 
finances and top-quality education will often (though not necessarily) generate bureau-
cratic assets that facilitate the production of local diplomatic resources. The size of per-
manent missions, the availability of in-house legal expertise, the capacity to draft policy 
documents, and information and communications technologies do play a large role in the 
practical unfolding of multilateral diplomacy by opening up space for competence claims 
and the wielding of influence. To be sure, these bureaucratic resources are structurally 
derived and pre-exist specific interactions. However, they play out, that is, they are 
turned into influence, only in and through practice, for example, by volunteering as the 
penholder on the drafting of a given resolution. It requires constant work to turn struc-
tural assets into power in practice. Over time, endogenous resources may build up in the 
form of reputation, for example, thereby blurring the distinction between structural and 
emergent power. But even so, like any pre-existing asset, reputation will fall short of 
influence unless it is mobilized in and through practice.
Practice theory, thus, primarily focuses on the enactment of power. We acknowledge 
the importance of an unequal playing field, institutional biases, and discursive domi-
nance, but we also ask how, exactly, these forces play out in practice. The way in which 
the game is played, not just its rules or the distribution of tokens among players, is crucial 
for explaining its outcome. In addition, our perspective enlarges the ontology of power 
resources by emphasizing locally generated resources in the form of competence. The 
challenge then becomes to operationalize power in practice, that is, to provide observa-
ble markers of the struggle for competence as the backbone of influence. Table 1 depicts 
three main processes in emergent power dynamics, which overlap in practice but should 
be kept analytically distinct for heuristic purposes. We conceive of these processes as 
cyclic and mutually reinforcing: wielding influence at time t helps claim competence at 
t+1, for example.
The (re)production of endogenous power resources begins with the positioning of a 
given individual or group as a competent player. This requires what Bourdieu called ‘ars 
inveniendi’ — ‘the creativity that comes with the feel for the game’ (Mérand, 2010: 352). 
In this socially thick understanding, the strategies and tactics used are not necessarily 
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conscious. Most of the time, they belong to the ‘practical sense,’ the tacit know-how of 
competent players (Pouliot, 2008: 269–277). This basic dynamic consists of playing the 
local order to one’s advantage. Competence is akin to what Fligstein (2001: 105–106) 
calls social skill, that is, ‘the ability to engage others in collective action.’ As he explains: 
‘Skilled actors understand the ambiguities and certainties of the field and work off them. 
They have a sense of what is possible and impossible’ (Fligstein, 2001: 114). By framing 
issues in certain ways or through initiative taking, players strive to establish their ways 
of doing things as competent practice.
The second process, once a competence claim has been made, is the social negotiation 
of skillfulness. In practice, competence is never recognized for good but is the object of 
endless contestation (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 7). The struggle over competence rests on 
a combination of competing moral and technical claims, on the one hand, and social 
maneuvering, on the other. As Barnes (2001: 27) puts it: ‘practices are socially recog-
nized forms of activity, done on the basis of what members learn from others and capable 
of being done well or badly, correctly or incorrectly.’ Whether a practice is performed 
well, badly, correctly, or incorrectly depends on social negotiation. In contrast to the pos-
session of capabilities, competence is irreducible to an individual attribute: it emerges 
out of a never-ending struggle for authority. By implication, there are no grounds from 
which to evaluate competence in an objective fashion. It would be wrong, then, to claim 
that such and such actors are ‘really’ competent, while others are not. For example, in the 
international intervention in Libya, we do not claim that the British and the French were 
‘really’ more competent than their counterparts. Our point is rather that their overwhelm-
ing influence over the diplomatic process stems, in part, from the success they obtained 
in getting their competence claims recognized by counterparts.
Processes of competence contestation are at the root of social change (Duvall and 
Chowdhury, 2011). We distinguish between two kinds of contestation. A first, thinner 
form of contestation may affect the relative positions of agents within a configuration by 
shuffling the distribution of endogenously generated resources. This is when the players 
accept the criteria of competence, but contest the way in which they or others are catego-
rized in order to climb positions in a particular setting. Then there is a second, thicker 
form of contestation, which not only regards the competence of another member, but also 
involves questioning the definition of competence altogether. Such contestation, when 
successful, changes not only the relative position between the agents in a particular prac-
tice, but the very game itself. As our case study below makes clear, however, in the rather 
conservative world of multilateral diplomacy, we observe a lot of thin contestation but 
rarely any of the thicker kind.
Table 1. Constitutive processes in emergent power dynamics.
Claiming competence Players seek to establish their mastery of the game by framing 
particular issues and positioning themselves as leaders
Social negotiation Other players acknowledge or challenge the skillfulness of a 
player’s moves as part of an ongoing struggle
Wielding influence Players cash out their socially recognized mastery in the form 
of non-coercive influence
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The third process of emergent power dynamics is the production of power effects in the 
form of non-coercive influence over outcomes. In order to produce such effects, socially 
recognized competence must be actively deployed as a power resource. To achieve this, 
practitioners must turn what passes for mastery into a non-coercive form of influence. The 
archetype, here, is the master–apprentice relationship (Pouliot, 2010: 47, 140–147). 
Masters wield power over apprentices because their practices are endowed with self-
evident competence. Of course, as we have just argued, in actual practice, the reputation 
for competence is usually fought over, making the translation of endogenous resources 
into power more complicated than our operationalization suggests. Power in practice is 
never passive; it requires the active deployment of competence. As Fligstein (2001: 115) 
writes: ‘Skilled social actors tailor their actions depending on the current organization of 
the field, their place in that field, and the current moves by skilled actors in other groups 
in the field.’ By implication, analysts should trace how competent players need to be 
actively engaged and constantly on their marks and aware of shifting positions. They 
should also identify how their moves deliver effects on outcomes. That said, our goal is 
not to create a tight temporal sequence, in which one obtains recognition at time t, and 
then wields influence at time t+1. The two processes are not independent, as in a Humean 
causal relationship, but constitutive of one another. Competence (as a socially recognized 
attribute) does not exist prior to influence (as an effect over outcome). For example, a 
master is not, first, competent, and only then, second, influent. The two come together, 
and this interplay is part and parcel of the story we tell about the Libyan intervention.
In the case study below, we show that each diplomatic setting generates its own unar-
ticulated common sense about what it takes to be a skillful negotiator. We isolate a num-
ber of features in the international intervention in Libya that flow from the active search, 
negotiation, and deployment of diplomatic competence. For instance, we demonstrate 
how superior legal knowledge was translated into influence in the UNSC, how an ambas-
sador’s ability to maintain a flexible position on a controversial issue improved his coun-
try’s status, how some NATO ambassadors mastered the production of ‘agreed language’ 
(which considerably limited the subsequent room for maneuver for other allies), and how 
the label of ‘diplomatically incompetent’ paralyzed certain players. Of course, the inter-
vention was a highly political issue, and we do not take sides on the opportunity. In the 
end, our analytical objective is to study power in practice.
Methods and data
A few words about case selection, data, and interpretation of sources are in order. The 
aim of this study is theory development and we stop short of drawing generalizations 
about international interventions or the probability of war. Instead, we see Libya as a 
challenging case for a practice perspective as it ventures into a territory — military inter-
vention — that is traditionally dominated by structuralist explanations. Indeed, if we find 
that the Libya intervention was significantly shaped by diplomatic struggles for compe-
tence — rather than just exogenous factors such as geostrategic interests, military capa-
bilities, or norms — we have strong support for the proposition that practice matters in 
international power politics. Admittedly, we cannot generalize the specific dynamics of 
the Libyan case to others, but that is mainly due to the ‘situationally specific’ workings 
of power in practice, to borrow Baldwin’s words.
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We selected officials from various levels and functions — permanent representatives 
(ambassadors), political experts, and international civil servants — based on their central 
position in the multilateral negotiations over Libya. Our questionnaire focused on the 
turning points in the negotiations and the various tactics and moves that diplomats used 
to influence the process. To increase reliability, we returned to several of the representa-
tives to discuss whether we had understood them correctly and we also used internal 
notes from several foreign services to double-check dates and events. Fully aware that 
interviewees may seek to portray their contributions in favorable ways, or rationalize 
their involvement in the process, we triangulated accounts and probed secondary sources 
of evidence. These interview artifacts, in fact, are but another piece of evidence of the 
struggle for competence in multilateral diplomacy.
The analysis builds on a total of 50 in-depth interviews. In New York City, we held a 
total of 36 interviews, covering 25 UN member states including 13 sitting at the Council 
in 2011. In Brussels, we interviewed representatives from nine different NATO member 
states as well as two senior officials from NATO’s international staff. Moreover, to cover 
the process in the EU, we interviewed two national diplomats and one senior EU official. 
We supplemented our interview data with field notes that we collected during a one-year 
ethnographical stint at the Foreign Ministry of one EU and NATO member state. Given 
the highly sensitive nature of our subject matter, all of our sources except one requested 
that our conversations remain strictly confidential. As a result, the article refrains from 
referring to individual names and specific titles, and we also erased certain countries’ 
names. When it comes to validity, we double-checked the accounts that we report, either 
with insiders or through a survey of world media reports.
The key limitation of our account is that, due to space constraints, we cannot spend 
much time mapping the multilateral playing field or the domestic politics of the interven-
ing powers prior to the eruption of the crisis in February 2011. We readily acknowledge 
that institutional rules at the Security Council (primarily, the veto for the Permanent Five 
(P5)), NATO (in particular, consensus decision-making), and the EU structured the nego-
tiations on Libya. At the corporate level, countries that possessed larger and deployable 
military assets, for instance, may also use the ‘outside option’ (Voeten, 2001) as a key 
source of leverage in multilateral negotiations (although that was not the case in the Libya 
intervention). In addition, as we mentioned above, over the years, countries such as France 
or the UK have accumulated significant bureaucratic resources and reputational capital in 
a multilateral site such as the UN. For these (and other) reasons, even in the early days of 
the negotiations, the multilateral battleground upon which negotiations took place was far 
from equal. Indeed, had the Gaddafi regime not been universally despised, it is unlikely 
that there would have been the same room for emergent power and British–French leader-
ship in the multilateral negotiations. This relatively unusual structural condition, in a 
sense, makes it easier for us to demonstrate how power in practice actually works.
Negotiating the Libyan war: Diplomatic struggles for 
competence and influence
Libya’s violent protests and uprisings began in mid-February 2011, paralleling similar 
political unrest in Tunisia and Egypt, among other Arab countries. Within a little more 
than a week, insurgents seized control of several areas in the eastern part of the country, 
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around Benghazi, as well as in the western side including the city of Misrata. Gaddafi’s 
regime swiftly moved to militarily quash the rebellion, warning of the possibility of civil 
war. On the international stage, the reaction was just as fast, as a number of multilateral 
organizations convened meetings to discuss the Libyan situation, including the Arab 
League and the UN SC, on 22 February, the EU on 24 February, as well as NATO, on 25 
February.
The adoption of Resolution 1970
Building on their organizational assets, leadership at the UN SC was rapidly captured by 
the French and British delegations through the deployment of particular diplomatic 
skills. After a presidential statement condemning the violence and calling for an immedi-
ate end to the hostilities was unanimously passed, on 22 February, British and French 
diplomats started to push hard for a resolution with teeth. However, ‘at that time it was 
impossible to get Russia and China on board,’ said one delegate. In order to win over 
reluctant Council members, British and French diplomats actively strove to establish 
themselves as the competent hands on Libya.
The UK quickly imposed itself as the ‘penholder’ or ‘lead country’ on Libya — that 
is, the Council member who takes it upon itself to draft resolutions and suggest a course 
of action. The UK delegation, with its many seasoned diplomats and numerous ‘experi-
enced lawyers,’ is widely recognized in New York for its superior skills in the many legal 
technicalities that often bog down the Council. One delegate observed that many provi-
sions on sanctions, for instance, are ‘cut and paste’ from previous, British-drafted resolu-
tions. Without a doubt, the ‘tremendous institutional memory’ that P5 missions have is a 
huge source of influence at the Council — perhaps the greatest difference, in the struggle 
for diplomatic competence, between them and E10 delegations, according to one insider. 
But these assets do not automatically lead to influence; the British and French also have 
to display ‘ars inveniendi.’ From the outset, the British ‘decided we’d throw everything 
in 1970. And that decision was taken really, really between us and London.’ In close 
consultation with the French, they drafted a text, okayed it with London and Paris, and 
circulated it to the Americans and European non-permanent members of the Council 
(Germany and Portugal). After the US approved the draft, it was shared with other P5 
members (China and Russia) and, later, with the rest of the Council members. Being 
penholder allowed the British to introduce a clause authorizing ‘all necessary measures 
for humanitarian access,’ which was later withdrawn as a bargaining chip with the 
Russians. In the end, according to an African diplomat, all that the other Council mem-
bers did was ‘fine-tune’ the British draft.
Once British leadership was recognized by others, this reputation for competence was 
easily cashed out in concrete influence: with the situation on the ground rapidly degen-
erating, British and French negotiators basically took control of the pace of the diplo-
matic process, moving ‘extremely quickly.’ Such a furious pace compelled less 
experienced members to make moves they might otherwise not have done: ‘I was very 
surprised at how fast things moved. … That was one of the main reasons why, for exam-
ple, the Indians, who had important reservations toward the referral to the ICC 
[International Criminal Court], at the end of the day, decided to go for the consensus’ on 
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Resolution 1970. The British and the French were also very active in harnessing the 
framing power of the media to construct the intervention as a ‘responsibility to protect 
civilians’ — a kind of ‘mélange of concepts: protection of civilians and the responsibility 
to protect,’ said one diplomat. Aided by Gaddafi’s inflammatory rhetoric, the P3 — as 
France, the UK, and the US are often designated in New York — imposed its own evi-
dence and frames even in the face of contrary reports from other members’ embassies in 
Tripoli, according to one E10 delegate.
As part of their struggle for competence, the British and French representatives also 
managed to twist UN procedures to their advantage. The most striking example, which 
diplomats said ‘contributed to the ability to pass Resolutions 1970 and 1973,’ is the 
defection of Libyan Deputy Permanent Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi on 21 February. 
Obtained through ‘lobbying,’ this event allowed the P3 ‘to say: “Clearly the Libyan peo-
ple want this [intervention].”’ The British and French delegations asked Dabbashi to 
write a letter to the Council presidency, held by Brazil, calling for an immediate Security 
Council meeting. This move led to the very first reunion on Libya, even though some 
members questioned Dabbashi’s diplomatic credentials. Through ‘informal handling,’ 
Dabbashi was allowed to speak in the name of the Libyan people. To translate compe-
tence into influence, P3 diplomats made the most of an unfolding and fast-moving situ-
ation: ‘you play these things as they come.… Later on, Gaddafi kept trying to send a 
replacement but you know there were hold-ups with the visas, blah blah blah. You know 
we played it for as long as we could. So we threw everything into that.’ Recognized 
mastery of procedures turned into critical influence.
P3 diplomats also took advantage of Lebanon’s cooperation to harness an Arab voice 
in favor of the intervention. After the Arab League suspended Libya’s membership, on 
21 February, the Lebanese mission contributed to the UK–French effort ‘by tabling reso-
lutions, lobbying and rallying support on certain initiatives.’ Providing an ‘inter-linkage’ 
between the League and the Council, Lebanese diplomats became ‘a very unique regional 
pulling factor,’ said one Western delegate: ‘Lebanon took basically the job of interpreting 
what the Arab League said and did, and not only bringing it to the attention of the Council 
but basically following up in the Council.’ Despite being a very small state, Lebanon was 
able to wield disproportionate influence through its partnership with P3 diplomats: ‘if 
you really want to get good results, you need people who are (a) influential and well-
connected in their systems … and (b) who are trusted enough to be able to go beyond 
their instructions, push things here, even though it might not necessarily fit with their 
instructions, and sell that back to their capitals. Those are the people that are really effec-
tive here. And that Lebanese guy was, in that, really effective.’ The skillful handling of 
this diplomatic opening paved the way to exerting power in practice.
Indeed, the amount of influence deployed by French and British diplomats is particu-
larly clear when it comes to a provision about the ICC calling for an international inquiry 
into alleged massacres performed by Gaddafi and his clique. Faced with American reluc-
tance, French and British experts ‘made many calls to Washington DC and NGOs [non-
governmental organizations] to say: “The US does not have anything to fear.” So before 
you have the resolution distributed to even the Permanent Five, you have civil society 
involved.’ When it came to Portugal, also hesitant at first, the French and British mis-
sions obtained an intervention by an ICC head, which put the Portuguese delegate ‘in an 
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embarrassing position.’ As for China and Russia, the most skeptical Council members, 
French and British diplomats asked — again — the defecting Libyan ambassador 
Dabbashi to write to the Presidency to request an ICC referral as part of Resolution 1970. 
With ‘an African country asking for an ICC referral,’ recounted one P3 diplomat, ‘the 
case was over because China and Russia were using the argument to wait for regional 
organizations first. But once the Libyan representative sent the request, South Africa 
gave up.… So did Russia. The Chinese asked for some time to make a decision and then 
ended up supporting it.’ Before influence can be wielded over diplomatic partners, the 
French and the British had to struggle for authority.
The ICC example helps understand the struggle for competence at the Security 
Council. In a display of diplomatic skill, the French and British were able to undermine 
the claims of other members despite their resonance with local practice. India, for 
instance, abandoned its opposition in the face of mounting pressure at the Council and in 
the media, although its objection was based on the need to avoid radicalization of the 
regime. Brazil, concerned with the many exemptions for non-signatory countries of the 
Rome Statute, suffered a similar fate: ‘When you have 14 countries in favor it is difficult 
even to abstain.’ In the face of P3 framing, expressing dissent became impossible: 
‘Sometimes we have positions that are not the mainstream, not the likely majority, and 
we express that, but it doesn’t mean that you are going to reach the point of voting 
against the resolution,’ confessed one E10 delegate. This reference to tacit knowledge 
about what it takes to be competent shows that certain power dynamics, with significant 
effects on world politics, inhere to the Security Council itself.
On 26 February, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970 (UN 
Doc. S/RES/1970), which invokes the R2P, demands an immediate end to hostilities 
under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter, refers the situation to the ICC, estab-
lishes regimes of arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze, and finally expresses the 
Council’s readiness to consider additional measures. Given the far-reaching scope of 
the text, one of the most intriguing aspects of the passing of Resolution 1970 is that it 
was not really carried through. As one P3 diplomat put it: ‘Resolution 1970 was passed 
on a Saturday. But on Sunday it had already been put in the dustbin.’ Instead, British and 
French diplomats used 1970 to build ‘momentum’; with 1970, ‘the bar was raised so 
high,’ said one diplomat, that ‘you are limiting the future options, really, because every 
time, you need to up the ante.’ In the face of a fast-evolving situation on the ground, 
competent diplomacy consists of building a multilateral momentum that takes on a life 
of its own.
The adoption of Resolution 1973
One of the key turning points in the negotiations that led to the intervention came on 13 
March 2011, when the Arab League called for a no-fly zone over the country. This 
‘unprecedented request,’ conveyed by Lebanon, provided the opportunity for the British 
mission to once again take the lead with drafting a new resolution. Quickly, however, it 
became clear that the US mission was not comfortable with a no-fly zone mandate only. 
Early into the negotiations, there were doubts that the American position may be a bluff, 
‘push[ing] it that far in order to have it vetoed so that they wouldn’t have to get involved.’ 
 at Copenhagen University Library on September 15, 2015ejt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 901
When it became clear that the White House had agreed to this course, late on 15 March, 
the British sought a compromise formula that would meet American objectives without 
offending the Arab League, which refused to have Western boots on the Libyan ground. 
The Lebanese suggested the innovative language of ‘no foreign occupation,’ which made 
its way into the resolution. As one Western diplomat put it: ‘It’s not very usual language. 
It’s a very political wording.’ However, this crafty compromise was key in overcoming 
Russia’s opposition to the resolution: the successful struggle for competence led to actual 
influence.
American diplomats skillfully made use of the presence of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
on the Council to cast Libya in terms of the Balkans precedent: ‘The Americans came out 
to say in the Council: “Do you want another Srebrenica?” … The Ambassador of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was at the Security Council meeting with me and he said to the Council: 
“I know what the airstrikes can do, I was there, but eventually it did bring peace.” 
Everyone was silent after this statement. This was a turning point at the Council.’ P3 
diplomats took control of information flows at the Council. In the words of one E10 
diplomat: ‘The information flowing in, and the discussions among diplomats outside the 
Council, often took the following form: “Do you want to wake up tomorrow and there is 
no Benghazi?” The way in which the information was presented was such that [we] 
ended up supporting Resolution 1973.’ Again, the skillful framing of the crisis played a 
role in determining voting patterns.
In the struggle to look competent, other Council members could not counter P3 
moves and resources. As one diplomat said, countries such as Russia were ‘skeptical at 
first, but they also didn’t have sufficient information to say that [the P3 narrative] was 
a lie.’ In deploying its tactics, French, British, and American delegates harnessed the 
local voices of the Libyan team of defected ambassadors as well as Lebanese dele-
gates: ‘Lebanon was very, very active on this and they were really corralling the Arab 
League to make demands and at the same time sitting on the Council and saying: “we 
are sitting there in the region, this is our patch, and we are telling you that you should 
do X, Y and Z.”’ In addition, presentations by UN officials, such as the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, were also instrumental in giving moral 
high grounds to those in favor of intervention. ‘Even for public opinion,’ said one del-
egate from a large non-permanent member, ‘the UK and France were very active in 
showing that they had the moral high ground and [they were] the good guys supporting 
the Libyan people.’
Once circulated to all members, the UK draft served to narrow the options on the 
Council table. When it comes to Operative Paragraph (OP) 4 (which contains the ‘all 
necessary measures’ provision), opined one delegate, ‘the position statement of coun-
tries, especially Brazil, made it clear that they were critical of the clause. But there were 
no other options offered.’ Here, the French made creative use of UN procedures by 
tabling the British-drafted resolution early: ‘We put our resolution in blue first, so we 
work on our draft first. It was the first time this happened, so the Russians didn’t know 
what to do.’2 By speeding up the whole negotiation process, P3 diplomats also hindered 
the formation of counter-blocks at the Council. As one large E10 diplomat put it: ‘These 
negotiations took place in a very short order.… There was no time here. There weren’t 
any side meetings, or very few.’
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Time pressure also helped undermine the more gradual approaches defended by sev-
eral other countries. One E10 diplomat, whose country wanted more time for negotia-
tion, said: ‘[We] wanted to explore all avenues, but there was a sense of urgency that 
pressured them into action.’ With the crisis aggravating on the ground, the P3 resorted to 
‘demarching,’ announcing to the Council that ‘we have a resolution and we go to the 
capitals to ask for support for it.’ In a very short time span, the negotiations became ‘a 
multilevel thing,’ with ‘contacts at a higher level in the capitals.’ Two sources, for 
instance, mentioned strong pressure by France over Gabon, at the time, an elected 
Council member. This illustrates nicely how external dynamics (here, in the form of 
bilateral pressure) and endogenous resources combine to produce power effects.
In order to wield influence over larger E10 countries, the P3 sought to establish their 
moral authority through what one diplomat described as ‘press harassment’: ‘They put 
the ambassador or the PR, for example of France, to give an interview to a major con-
servative newspaper in [country X] saying: “Well, [country X] is not acting for the peo-
ple of Libya, whatever and so on.”’ In this specific country’s case, this kind of pressuring 
had the effect of making its gradualist approach to intervention appear insufficient and, 
in the end, impracticable (even though several other members shared it):
the issue of the moral high ground and the narrative was very important at that moment. Of course 
you had the media, mostly from the P3 countries, and now Qatar, which was allied with the P3. 
So I think that the cost of having vetoed, for example for Russia and China, would have been so 
high, it would have been very difficult to sustain. And to tell you frankly, this use of the media is 
incredible. They are professional.… This power of determining the agenda, saying: ‘the moral 
situation is that and the transgressor is this’ — is huge. So it’s difficult to fight against this.
One delegate from another large, non-permanent member put forward the very same 
story: ‘They [the P3 diplomats] pressure you through media leakages: they pressure you 
in the corner and then you see on TV: “one country is standing in the way, against this 
issue.” You don’t want to be seen standing alone.’ Being so isolated would deal a serious 
blow to one’s competence in the eyes of partners and undermine influence.
In the end, Security Council Resolution 1973 (UN Doc. S/RES/1973) authorizing mem-
bers to take ‘all necessary measures … to protect civilians’ was passed on 17 March 2011 
with 10 favorable votes and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia). 
Resolution 1973 was the result of skillful framing, including ‘press harassment,’ crafty 
compromises, demarching coupled with time pressure, and the ability to display the moral 
high ground. To repeat an earlier point, throughout the negotiations, the British and the 
French made use of their institutional privileges, bureaucratic expertise, and reputation to 
establish their competence. But a full account of the negotiations also requires showing 
how these assets were creatively put to work. As Zartman and Rubin (2002: 10) illustrate: 
‘The issue with power as a possession is that it fails to take into account the control of 
resources through will and skill. It takes more than brushes and paint to paint a picture.’
Germany and South Africa in the wake of Resolution 1973
The German abstention on Resolution 1973 created a storm in the world of multilateral 
diplomacy. In New York, the decision was perceived as ‘surprising’ and even ‘shocking’ 
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by other diplomats, given that it was unprecedented for Berlin to go it alone without its 
usual partners on the multilateral stage. The abstention seriously undermined Germany’s 
diplomatic standing as a competent player, in the eyes of its partners, and it consequently 
dented the country’s ability to wield influence in and through practice. From our inter-
views, it appears that the German UN mission did not fully grasp the course of negotia-
tions and, in particular, the American change of mind that occurred late on 15 March. Of 
course, there was disagreement between the German chancellery and foreign ministry, 
but our sources suggest that decision-makers and analysts thought that the US would not 
go for the war and, thus, felt safe in their objection.
Indeed, the first British draft did not contain any provision regarding the use of mili-
tary force. While the P3 and Lebanon were working on more forceful language in 
response to the new American leadership, Germany was reportedly pursuing ‘a sanctions 
track’ in cooperation with other Council members. When, on 16 March, US Ambassador 
Susan Rice took the floor to explain what the military intervention would entail, recalled 
one insider, ‘for the Germans this became problematic and they said: “this is not what we 
understood and what we signed up for.”’ In this fast-paced evolving context, Berlin 
ended up sending ‘tough instructions’ that left its New York diplomats ‘pretty annoyed.’ 
One close partner stamped Germany as incompetent, arguing that the abstention ‘showed 
a delay in assuming responsibility for a country that has claimed greater responsibility in 
the maintenance of international peace and security.’
In order to make up for their bad posture, German diplomats took a number of steps 
in both Brussels and New York. This repair work, in which competence is fought for, can 
only be understood from the perspective of the diplomatic practice within which it is 
embedded. Germany had lost face and needed to compensate to regain its status at the 
UNSC. From then on, Germany consistently sought to be looked at as a ‘constructive 
partner on the Council on all issues,’ aligning its subsequent votes with those of France 
and the UK and even taking it to the barricades for its partners. For example, while the 
Brazilians put forward the notion of ‘responsibility while protecting,’ in a thinly dis-
guised attack on the NATO intervention, overzealous German diplomats were ‘more 
vocal in criticism … than other countries like, for example, the United Kingdom. Because 
they were in a fragile position, to make up for their abstention.’ One close ally concurred 
that Germany had to ‘overcompensate’ for its abstention, in an attempt to regain its lost 
authority and, potentially, its influence.
Meanwhile, in NATO, the abstention greatly damaged the country’s capacity to exert 
power on the ground: ‘Germany is no longer a player. Worst of all, you cannot count on 
Germany in NATO anymore.’ The official further commented: ‘In Berlin, they now believe 
that they have less influence [in NATO], and I have to say that they are right.’ Struggling to 
compensate, the German cabinet voted, on 23 March 2011, to increase Germany’s role in 
surveillance flights over Afghanistan in an effort to free up NATO Airborne Warning and 
Control System planes for ongoing air strikes in North Africa. But such ‘back filling’ does 
not always translate into influence, as one delegate mentioned: ‘How much credit did they 
get? Not much. The damage was done.’ Once undermined, competence is not easily 
restored, and without social recognition, a country’s diplomats weigh considerably less.
In a somewhat reversed logic, South Africa equally suffered from its support of 
Resolution 1973. Given the lack of a unified African Union (AU) position at the time, the 
country found itself in a very uncomfortable position, pushing for more diplomacy while 
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being pressurized to help stop the killing of civilians. Why did South Africa not join 
Brazil and India in abstaining? According to one P3 diplomat, ‘we didn’t know how they 
[South Africa] would vote until the very last minute.… The vote was delayed while they 
were getting instructions. They didn’t have instructions.’ Faced with similar pressure as 
their German counterparts, though, the South African mission ended up providing the 
swing vote on 1973, because ‘Nigeria had decided they would vote along with South 
Africa in this case. So if they had not voted in favor in this case, if they had abstained, 
you would only have eight votes.’ This kingmaker position put the country under the 
spotlight and it was ‘strongly criticized’ by African countries for colluding with the West. 
In an Asian delegate’s view, the P3 fooled South Africa ‘by including this AU thing [i.e. 
a mention of the AU mediation effort], and once the resolution was adopted … they 
threw South Africa like they throw the fly out of the milk.’ In the view of many UN 
countries, for South Africa to align with the P3 was plainly incompetent.
Similar to Germany’s ‘overcompensation,’ South Africa followed its positive vote on 
Resolution 1973 with a sustained attempt to restore its diplomatic authority by denounc-
ing the military intervention in Libya and the broad interpretation of the mandate pro-
vided in the text. In order to regain its leadership on the continent, South Africa strongly 
pushed for a greater mediating role for the AU, but its efforts were in vain. There was a 
concerted effort, led by the P3, to delegitimize this initiative as doomed to fail: ‘we said, 
“you know the plan that you came up with isn’t realistic.”’ In New York, efforts were 
made to sabotage a planned meeting between the AU and the Security Council: 
‘Sometimes it’s the little things that matter, for example the UN Secretariat’s power. 
When the South African Foreign Minister came to visit the UN and wanted to hold an 
AU–UNSC meeting, there were problems over the room books.… the African Union 
was only given a side-room to hold the meeting. On top of that, some countries sent 
lower-level representations to the UNSC–AU meeting. The AU realized the meaning 
afterwards and was furious. This all sends a diplomatic message.’ Diplomatic compe-
tence is hard-fought and not all players manage to be recognized as skillful. In the Libyan 
case, the limiting effects on South African influence were clear.
The role of NATO and the EU
On 19 March, only two days after the adoption of Resolution 1973 and before most states 
had had time to digest the dramatic negotiations in New York, France staged a crisis 
meeting in Paris. There, agreement was reached that military action by French, British, 
and US forces would begin on 19–20 March, with the aim to protect Libyan civilians and 
degrade the regime’s capability to resist the no-fly zone. At that time, the situation in 
Benghazi was deteriorating, with civilians at risk of massacre by pro-Gaddafi forces. 
Command and control of operations would initially rest with the US in what became 
known as ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn.’
In the first weeks of March, a majority of NATO allies were reluctant or outright 
against any kind of NATO military engagement in Libya. Members such as France, 
Germany, Poland, and Turkey — for very different reasons — made their opposition 
clear. British diplomats established creative leadership by skillfully devising the criteria 
that could pave the way for a military engagement by NATO. This became known as the 
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‘Leslie criteria,’ named after UK Ambassador Mariot Leslie, who at a North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) meeting on 10 March, set out three conditions for NATO intervention: 
(1) a demonstrable need for military activity; (2) a clear legal basis; and (3) regional sup-
port. This ‘agreed language’ made some arguments reasonable and others out of line, 
eventually helping legitimize the war by answering to domestic concerns in most NATO 
countries. This show of competence by the British mission allowed the country to exert 
quite a significant influence over the outcome.
While the Leslie criteria clarified the conditions for intervention, they did not settle 
the role of the Alliance. After leading the first few days of operation, the US insisted that 
the NAC should be the only and supreme political decision-making body during the 
operation. France opposed on the grounds that NATO was ‘a purely military organiza-
tion.’ Turkey favored transforming the operation into a humanitarian mission. Germany 
quickly announced that it would not participate, but not obstruct either. This disagree-
ment on the role of NATO led the UK and France, in a show of diplomatic creativity, to 
set up a ‘Libya Contact Group’ in late March, comprising NATO countries as well as the 
UN Secretary-General and delegates from the Arab League. French diplomats argued 
that the Contact Group appeared more legitimate than the NAC in view of the regional 
support criterion. However, several sources explain that the ‘real’ problem was that in 
NATO, ‘France has to accept US leadership.’
To prevent the Alliance from taking over full control of the operation, French diplo-
mats also pushed for a parallel diplomatic process in the EU. A French ‘dream scenario’ 
— openly voiced by French diplomats in Brussels — was a coalition of countries led by 
France and the UK with strong EU involvement. However, from the very beginning, this 
was seen as an ‘absurd idea’ by other EU and NATO diplomats. Not only did EU member 
states not agree on Libya, but also, ‘[e]verybody knew that it would never work. None of 
the other member states wanted a strong EU involvement because the EU clearly lacked 
the command structure and capacities.’ Nonetheless, France managed to make the EU’s 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) ‘meet regularly and listen to Libya briefings 
whose content was essentially identical to those provided in the NAC.’ In the struggle for 
diplomatic competence, the EU and its officials were judged harshly by many diplomats. 
For example, letters were circulated between foreign ministers criticizing Catherine 
Ashton and the European External Action Service (EEAS), while reports from PSC 
meetings denounced the EEAS’s ‘poor preparations of foreign affairs minister’s meet-
ings,’ ‘lack of in-depth knowledge,’ and the need for more ‘strategy and leadership.’ 
Failure to establish the EU’s competence significantly constrained its influence over the 
multilateral process.
Yet French diplomats pressured the EEAS to draft proposals for a humanitarian EU 
mission in Libya to avoid NATO from taking over the leadership. On 12 March, EU 
foreign ministers were presented with a 61-page document on the concept of operations, 
prepared by the EEAS, including various scenarios for the mission, such as securing port 
areas, aid delivery corridors, loading and unloading ships, and providing naval assis-
tance. The EEAS was then tasked to compose a draft mandate for an EU mission in 
Libya — a process in which ‘French diplomats were ghost writers.’ On 1 April, the 
Council formally adopted the legal framework for Operation EUFOR Libya, with a 
budget of EUR 7.9 million for an initial period of four months (Council Decision 
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2011/210/CFSP). Around 100 staff were stationed at the operational headquarters in 
Rome to plan the operation. At the end of the day, though, they were all sent home after 
just three months.
France’s allies were becoming anxious. On 22 March, Italy demanded that NATO 
take over the operations, threatening to no longer authorize the use of its air bases. The 
Netherlands also required that the command be under NATO control. However, with the 
final operation plan on the table, the French mission continued to oppose NAC leader-
ship. Discussions among the 28 allies were intense. At the last weekend meeting, French 
ambassador Errera and his officials left the negotiations in anger. According to one sen-
ior diplomat, ‘if the debate had gone wrong, it could have been the end of the alliance’ 
because the issue was so central to what NATO is. A diplomatic solution was found in a 
brief document drafted by the US and French NATO delegations on 25 March. The docu-
ment stated that the NAC was ‘politically responsible’ for the operations (a US and 
Turkish sine qua non requirement), while France received guarantees that the Libya 
Contact Group would be responsible for political strategies during and after the war. 
France thereby ensured that it could continue to claim diplomatic leadership and compe-
tence despite NATO involvement.
With the French on board and the Germans back in the fold, only the Turks continued 
to obstruct a NATO take over of the military intervention, concerned not only about its 
commercial interests and the thousands of Turkish citizens residing in Libya, but also 
about ‘Turkey’s role as regional leader and a Moslem country.’ On 22 March, Turkey 
vetoed NATO taking over the no-fly-zone operation. Exploiting this leverage, Turkish 
diplomats were seen as competently ‘selling themselves as expensively as possible.’ 
According to one diplomat, the Turkish delegation assumed a position that ‘they are 
well-known for in both the EU and NATO: the tough negotiator.’ Referring to their ‘inex-
cusable exclusion’ from the Paris meeting, they played ‘carpet sellers,’ to use a delegate’s 
image. On 24 March, Ankara finally acceded to US pressure to support the no-fly zone. 
Two weeks after the adoption of Resolution 1973, NATO aircraft took off from bases in 
the Southern Mediterranean and began striking military forces in Libya that were thought 
to be attacking civilians.
When asked to describe the decisive moments during the NATO negotiations, one 
diplomat from a smaller Western ally put it thus: ‘At some point you just know where the 
wind blows.’ The wind metaphor is striking because it points to a force which does not 
stem from an individual actor yet is locally generated and experienced. In other words, 
in the struggle for competence, the diplomatic process gradually gains a life of its own. 
For medium-sized and smaller allies, this pressure to participate was almost intuitively 
sensed. Italy’s change of position provides a good example. At the outbreak of the crisis, 
Italy was deeply skeptical toward any kind of intervention, apprehending that its com-
mercial and strategic interests could be severely challenged by a policy of confrontation 
with the Gadhafi regime. In addition, the US’s ambiguous position in the run-up to the 
NATO-led intervention made it difficult for Italian diplomats to maneuver, given their 
traditional transatlantic stance. Fully aware of this difficult position, the newly appointed 
Italian NATO ambassador carefully avoided making any categorical statements during 
the negotiations. As one of his counterparts explains: ‘He sensed where the wind blew.’ 
One senior NATO official involved in the planning of the operation explained: ‘I would 
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have wanted Italy to do it before, but once it joined [the consensus], it really did join.’ In 
the end, Italy performed as a good ally because its diplomats were able to change posi-
tion quickly, making Italian air bases available for the operations and even participating 
actively in the war, despite its initial reluctance to do so.
What did medium-sized or smaller NATO allies get out of following leading members 
on Libya? One of the gains from being seen as an active and competent ally, reportedly, is 
to obtain institutional recognition, which can be turned into influence, for instance by 
being awarded high-level positions in NATO. Thus, Danish diplomats are convinced that 
previous Danish activism has resulted in their former Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen becoming NATO Secretary-General. ‘You would never give the SG [Secretary-
General] position to a country that is free-rider. When you contribute military, it affects 
your position inside NATO. This is not something you can quantify. It is something you 
feel; you feel it.’ In other words, for some allies, the decision to support a NATO operation 
in Libya reflects more their concerns to remain a respected NATO ally than their specific 
national interests in Libya. The hope, in turn, is that recognized competence will later be 
turned into influence.
The fallout at the UNSC
To conclude our case study, let us go back to New York to analyze how the struggle for 
competence may prevent diplomats from wielding influence. Following the passing of 
Resolution 1973, the five BRICS countries, which happened to be all sitting on the 
UNSC in 2011, took action. A number of diplomats were of the view that ‘the BRICS 
made a real change in how policies were made in the Security Council. Sometimes, the 
P3 had real difficulties to convince the BRICS, which gave the P3 a change.’ One key 
reason is that IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) countries altered the balance of 
power at the Council: ‘Normally if Russia opposed they would be supported by China. 
But in this case, you had more countries that would support Russia and China’s position, 
making them look less isolated.’ One insider confirmed, on that note, that ‘we had sepa-
rate meetings with them [the other BRICS] to coordinate our opinions, and it worked 
well and it helped cover common ground.’ If such is the case, however, how can we 
explain that when the BRICS went to the barricades against the NATO intervention, their 
actual influence over events was so limited? Why, for instance, did the Russian push for 
‘an immediate cessation of hostilities’ fail to ‘receive enough support’ at the Council 
despite the BRICS alignment of interest?
To be sure, the P3 could withstand a prolonged, hostile charge by BRICS and their 
followers because the military operation was already under way in Libya. It remains 
striking, however, how NATO members of the Council skillfully dispelled the legal and 
political charge mounted by the BRICS. For months, the latter claimed that Alliance 
bombings and military activities had far exceeded the mandate of civilian protection 
provided by the Security Council. As one diplomat recalled: ‘The Russian ambassador 
called Resolution 1973 a “rubber resolution” because you could bend it and do whatever 
your wanted with it.’ Another added: ‘Some countries felt duped; they didn’t understand 
the way the resolution was interpreted.’ Whether these complaints were valid or not is, 
for the purpose of our demonstration, not the point. What is striking rather is that the 
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BRICS charge never really hit home, and it did not visibly affect the implementation of 
the resolution. Despite a fierce struggle to make competent diplomatic arguments, they 
were never recognized as such, and could not wield power in practice.
For example, the Russians argued that taking sides in an internal conflict went beyond 
the UN’s mandate and duty of neutrality. The Russian reasoning resonated in the UN: ‘It 
is one thing to enforce a no-fly zone so the government can’t use aircraft to launch 
attacks on civilians and it is another thing to take sides in a civil war. We actually 
reminded the Council members that there were also [operative paragraphs] 1 and 2 [in 
Resolution 1973], which called for an immediate cessation and dialogue. It never took 
place, however.’ In the end, Russian diplomats were not able to win the argument with 
the P3 and alter the operation: ‘You have to be realistic: three permanent members were 
taking part in the military operation. Do you think they would allow for a change in the 
implementation through a Security Council vote? We raised the issue over and over 
again but the other Council members replied that they tried to protect civilians from a 
tyrant.’ Even a veto-holder had to resign itself as it became clear that it was losing the 
struggle for diplomatic authority.
Brazil experienced a similar powerlessness with its own argument — that the military 
intervention was aggravating the loss of human lives. As per one diplomat’s account: ‘I 
think it was very difficult to sell the idea, which was our argument, that in order to reduce 
casualties in general during the conflict, you would have to bring the parties to the table 
and not fuel the conflict.… If the mandate is to protect civilians, how do you attack a city 
which is not the main city at risk of, for example, war crimes or genocide?’ Here, again, 
the argument, despite its resonance with the R2P doctrine, failed to convince and effect 
change. One P3 official angrily recalled the events: ‘Even though, you know, the 
Brazilians bang on about human rights and this and that, then they take a completely dif-
ferent position when it comes down to it. It’s astonishing really.’ In his mind, diplomatic 
incompetence stemmed from the lack of consistency: ‘The Chinese and the Russians, 
you expect that kind of nonsense. But the South Africans, after what they’ve been 
through, and indeed the Brazilians and all their talk, it’s quite shocking.’ Opposition to 
the intervention, even for the protection of human lives, was skillfully framed as an 
unwillingness to defend human lives. As a representative from one of the dissident coun-
tries conceded: ‘I think they [P3 diplomats] tried to evoke the moral high ground by 
saving the heroic Libyan people who were fighting for their rights, which is a very com-
pelling argument.’ After weeks of diplomatic struggle, many BRICS diplomats resigned 
themselves to their inability to exert influence, showing how the struggle for diplomatic 
competence can turn structurally strong countries into powerless actors on the Council.
The struggle for diplomatic competence, including the BRICS’s failure to affect out-
comes, is obvious in the way that P3 diplomats dismissed the uproar as ‘irresponsible.’ 
As one delegate said: ‘Some P3 were annoyed by some of the non-permanent members, 
arguing that they were not being constructive enough and should be more compromis-
ing.’ Another confessed: ‘A French diplomat said to me: “To be a permanent member, 
you need to be responsible and decisive. But they [IBSA] were not. You need to have 
strong views, and the means [to achieve them]; they didn’t.”’ On the Brazilians, one P3 
diplomat regretted: ‘You basically couldn’t work with them. I mean you basically just 
bounce them and you try and corner them.’ His words were no kinder in relation to his 
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Indian interlocutors: ‘they’ve achieved nothing. It’s not clear what they want or what 
they would want out of their time on the Council … I don’t think they are good perform-
ers.’ This episode clearly shows how those who establish themselves as masters of the 
multilateral game can influence outcomes.
All in all, a practice approach implies that there is no such thing as ‘power’ in a uni-
versal, transcendental, sense. Power in practice involves a constant negotiation of what 
counts as competent (e.g. ‘responsible,’ ‘decisive,’ and ‘informed’) and incompetent 
(‘irresponsible,’ ‘inconsistent,’ and ‘unprepared’) moves. This very negotiation is part of 
defining what the practice is. In this emergent process, Lebanon could play a central role, 
Germany had to compensate, the BRICS were sidelined, while France punched above its 
weight. Power in practice is a performance whose processes often depart from the pre-
existing distribution of exogenous resources.
Conclusion
Drawing on the recent surge of practice-oriented scholarship in IR theory, this article devel-
ops a theoretical framework addressing how power works through local practices and rou-
tines in world politics. We have argued that some power resources emerge out of practical 
competence, which requires constant work and negotiation. The framework focused on 
three constitutive processes of power in practice: the claim for competence; the social 
negotiation of skillfulness; and the deployment of recognized mastery in the form of influ-
ence. The result is a broader ontology of power that recognizes the key role of social rela-
tions in the generation of resources. Power should be studied not just as the possession of 
material capabilities or as discursive dominance, but also from the perspective of everyday 
social relations, including the ways in which various resources are put to task.
The second part of the article applied the framework to the multilateral negotiation of 
the 2011 international intervention in Libya. Contrary to realists pointing to underlying 
material interests of the intervening parties or liberals and constructivists arguing that 
normative changes among Western states explain humanitarian interventions, this article 
showed that micro-level diplomatic dynamics are crucial to explain the negotiation pro-
cess. For example, the practice approach solves the puzzling UNSC process by which the 
P3 was able to disarm its opponents — including China and Russia — by undermining 
as ‘irresponsible’ those proposals in favor of more diplomacy and sanctions. Our inter-
views with key diplomats enable us to show that what was at stake in the hectic weeks 
leading up to the intervention was not just a play of national interests with regards to 
Libya, but a complex social game in which maneuvering for diplomatic competence 
became an end in itself.
A focus on emergent power has broader implications for the study of world politics. 
The social categorization of competence and incompetence contributes to the ranking 
of groups and individuals within a particular practice and it has power effects. Our case 
study clearly reveals the inner workings of the utterly dominant position currently 
enjoyed by a few Western countries in multilateral security dynamics. While we 
already knew that the P3 call the shots at the Security Council, our understanding of 
how this is done in actual practice has so far remained rudimentary. Our article points 
to the importance of emergent power dynamics, that is, endogenous power resources 
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generated, struggled over, and converted into influence within particular settings. It 
shows how traditional Western powers seem to master and control the diplomatic game 
in ways that go beyond their formal positions in multilateral organizations. Thus, the 
challenge that our article raises is also of a theoretical nature: just how is it possible to 
accumulate competence — a power resource that is so evanescent on the face of it? IR 
theory needs a deeper understanding of the everyday struggles through which particu-
lar skills become recognized as power resources and affect world politics. More gener-
ally, emergence as a social phenomenon, characteristic of complex social systems, 
merits more investigation in IR.
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Note
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2. In Security Council procedure, a resolution is put in blue when negotiations approach their 
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